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Article

Wartime Judgments of Presidential
Power: Striking Down but Not Back
William G. Howell†
When assessing presidential actions taken during war, Supreme Court Justices do not merely acknowledge the objective
threat that the nation faces. They often argue, and almost always imply, that foreign threats sanction judicial deference to
the President.
Two tendencies exhibited by the Court support both assertions. First, even when they overturn presidential wartime initiatives, Justices make a point of conveying their appreciation
for the material threat that the nation faces.1 Indeed, even
landmark repudiations of presidential power during periods of
war acknowledge the practical challenges presidents face in
leading the nation to military victory.2 Second, when they overturn presidential wartime initiatives, Justices often intimate
that the Court might have ruled differently if either the exigencies of war were more immediate or the President’s initiative
more integral to the war effort itself.3
† Associate Professor, University of Chicago, Harris School of Public
Policy. Paper prepared for the Minnesota Law Review Symposium, “Law &
Politics in the 21st Century,” University of Minnesota Law School, October 17,
2008. I thank Rose Kelanic and Evan Coren for research assistance. Long conversations with Nancy Staudt laid the foundation for the core arguments herein. For financial support, the author thanks the Smith Richardson Foundation
and the Program on Political Institutions at the University of Chicago. Copyright © 2009 by William G. Howell.
1. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008) (“The real
risks, the real threats, of terrorist attacks are constant and not likely to soon
abate.”).
2. See, e.g., id. at 2276–77 (“[T]he President . . . begin[s] the day with
briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our nation and its
people. The law must accord the executive substantial authority to apprehend
and detain those who pose a real danger to our security.”).
3. See, e.g., id. at 2277 (“If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose
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As a prelude to a more comprehensive analysis of Supreme
Court rulings on presidential power during times of peace and
war,4 this Article employs a least likely research design and
scrutinizes the opinions of three Supreme Court cases: Ex parte
Milligan,5 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,6 and Boumediene v. Bush.7 These three cases, most would agree, constitute the preeminent examples of judicial wartime rebukes of
presidential power during each of the last three centuries.
Hence, if the Justices in these cases acknowledge the exceptional nature of war and the importance of temporarily conferring discretion upon the presidents who wage it, then they
surely do so in the larger class of wartime challenges to presidential power. Wherever the upper bound of judicial deference
may lie, these three cases demonstrate that the lower bound
nonetheless recognizes the relevance of war when adjudicating
challenges to presidential power and the possibility of upholding at least some actions that, if evaluated during periods of
peace, would not withstand judicial scrutiny.
With hopes of avoiding distractions, five points warrant
mention from the outset. First, the discussion that follows is
meant to be strictly positive. I have no interest in engaging the
rich, voluminous, debates about what Justices ought to do during periods of crisis.8 These normative debates for much too
long have lacked empirical grounding, as scholars advance doctrine without any systematic evidence about how judges actually behave during times of peace and war. This Article (and the
larger project to which it alludes) clarifies how wars actually
impact judicial decision making on issues of presidential power.
More specifically, it investigates how Supreme Court Justices,
dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might not have this luxury.”).
4. WILLIAM HOWELL, IN TIMES OF WAR: PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE
MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY (forthcoming).
5. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
6. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
7. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
8. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 101–22 (2006); Oren Gross, Chaos and
Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112
YALE L.J. 1011, 1096–134 (2003); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Originalism and Emergencies: A Reply to Lawson, 87 B.U. L. REV. 313–21 (2007);
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors Epstein
and Wells, 69 MO. L. REV. 959, 973–70 (2004); Christina E. Wells, Questioning
Deference, 69 MO. L. REV. 903, 935–49 (2004).
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in their own opinions, talk about war when reflecting upon either the constitutionality or statutory authority of presidential
actions taken during war. It has nothing to say about whether
these rulings, or the jurisprudence that supports them, are
good or bad.
Second, as much as is possible, the analysis herein focuses
squarely on wartime judicial rulings on presidential power, and
not on the larger class of civil liberties and rights which have
received ample attention elsewhere.9
Third, this Article makes no pretense of having revealed a
formal doctrine or principle that wars automatically trigger.
The proposition that judges evaluate presidents by different
standards during times of peace and war has always been contested.10 The observations below, therefore, speak to what
might more appropriately be called a norm of judicial decision
making. Indeed, while wars may influence a Justice’s assessment of presidential power,11 the onset of war does not automatically trigger a new set of rules or procedures that explicitly
bind the Justice to one course of action or another.
Fourth, this Article examines how the Justices’ opinions reflect upon their thinking about the relevance of war. Its purpose decidedly is not to use these opinions to establish either
the precedential value of a case, or the general importance of a
case in the pantheon of judicial rulings. Consequentially, in addition to the majority opinions, I also cull the entirety of concurring and dissenting opinions (very much including dicta) for
references to the incidence of war and its relevance for judicial
decision making.12
9. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN
WARTIME (2004); GEOFFREY R. STONE, WAR AND LIBERTY (2007); David Cole,
Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times
of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003); Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme
Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1 (2005); Arthur H. Garrison, The Judiciary in Times of National Security Crisis and Terrorism: Ubi Inter Arma Enim Silent Leges, Quis Custodiet Ipsos
Custodes?, 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 165 (2006); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273.
10. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, What is War? Reflections on Free Speech in “Wartime,” 36 RUTGERS L.J. 833, 833 (discussing
whether different standards of judicial review are appropriate during wartime).
11. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008).
12. Admittedly, when examining dissenting opinions, the assertion that
these cases constitute a “least likely” research agenda begins to break down.
Though the majority opinions constitute setbacks for presidents during times
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Finally, the fact that this small sample of wartime opinions
so prominently and pervasively features practical considerations about war does not prove that wars caused the Justices to
rule as they did. Even the most careful reading of the three
cases, after all, does not substitute for a systematic evaluation
of the universe of war- and peace-time challenges to presidential power.13 Additionally, it is quite possible that Justices reason backwards from positions they take on purely ideological
grounds.14 During war, unelected Justices also may feel compelled to signal to the President, Congress, and the public that
they understand the security threat facing the nation, and that
they appreciate the sacrifices of those individuals who are trying to address it. The cases, nonetheless, present a hard test for
the more modest proposition that Supreme Court Justices give
credence to norms that, depending upon one’s formulation, recommend varying amounts of heightened judicial deference during times of war.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I very briefly summarizes the relevant literature on presidential power, war, and
what scholars have intermittently called “crisis jurisprudence,”15 the “constitutional law of war,”16 “executive expediency discourse,”17 the “doctrine of constitutional relativity,”18 and

of war, there is no reason to believe that the dissenting opinions examined below represent a hard case for the proposition that Justices are more prone to
defer to the President during peace than during war.
13. This Article, nonetheless, may help inform the kind of quantitative
study that would provide a basis upon which to draw causal inferences. The
Justices in these three cases offer no indication that they hold presidents to
higher standards during periods of war than during times of peace, suggesting
that war can only aid a President’s chances in court. See infra Part II. Additionally, the probability that the courts would uphold wartime actions taken
by presidents is likely to increase when the nation faces larger, more imminent security threats, and when Justices are asked to evaluate presidential
actions that are integral to the military campaign. And the age, popularity,
and perceived success of a war may also bear upon the Court’s willingness to
overturn assertions of presidential authority. By analyzing a much larger
sample of war- and peace-time challenges to presidential power, each of these
empirical claims can readily be tested.
14. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Dissents Against Type, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1535, 1536–37 (2009) (arguing that Justices generally vote in criminal cases
based on their preferred policy outcomes).
15. Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 1.
16. EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 76 (1947).
17. Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and
Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671, 674 (1998).
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the “judicial deference thesis.”19 Part II, which constitutes the
core of this essay, culls three landmark rulings against executive power for indications of how wars (if at all) influenced the
Justices’ decisions. Part III then summarizes the lessons from
these cases and offers some modest assessments about judicial
checks on presidential power.
I. THEORIES OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN WARTIME
Wars do not merely disrupt systems of governance. Wars
remake governments. They thrust politicians into new debates
about policy issues, they reshape the relationships between individuals and states, and they redefine the very purposes of
government.20 And wars have the potential to do more still.
They can reallocate power among the various branches of government. And almost always, scholars and statesmen have argued since at least the nation’s founding, wars do so in ways
that benefit the President.21
A. FOUNDING CONCERNS ABOUT WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL
POWER
The Founders worried a great deal about the possibility
that foreign wars might stimulate presidential action and exalt
the office of the presidency. Indeed, it was for precisely this
reason that the Constitution vests so much war-making authority in Congress, which was thought to slow the pace of war, rather than the President, who was feared to use the military for
his own private purposes and who, through war, might find the
means by which to consolidate his control over the machinery of
government.22
In Federalist Number 8, Alexander Hamilton recognized
that “[i]t is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the
expense of the legislative authority.”23 Echoing these senti18. See LOUIS SMITH, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY POWER 288
(1951).
19. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 313.
20. See ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 57–77 (1987); David R. Mayhew, Wars
and American Politics, in 3 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 473, 473–93 (2005).
21. See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 105 (2003).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, at 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
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ments, Madison argued in Helvidius 4 that “[w]ar is in fact the
true nurse of executive aggrandizement.”24 After all, Madison
continued, “[i]n war the honors and emoluments of office are to
be multiplied; and it is the executive patronage under which
they are to be enjoyed.”25 Hamilton and Madison, of course,
disagreed vehemently about the merits of a powerful presidency. But on their particular assessment of war’s contribution to
presidential power, the two adversaries stood together. If any
branch of government benefits from war, it is the executive.
On the issue of ratification, the Anti-Federalists broke with
both Hamilton and Madison, insisting that the Constitution’s
safeguards of individual liberty were wholly insufficient.26 But
at a deeper level, they too shared Hamilton and Madison’s assessments of war and presidential power.27 The Anti-Federalist
Papers bristle with condemnation against an “elective king”
whose war powers permit, and even encourage, the concentration of virtually all government authority.28 Writing under the
pseudonym Cato, George Clinton recognized the President as
“the generalissimo of the nation . . . [who] of course, has the
command and controul [sic] of the army, navy and militia; he is
the general conservator of the peace of the union . . . .”29 By taking the nation to war, Clinton insisted, the President would
brandish powers that no government of a free people should retain.30 Clinton recognized that wars do not merely augment the
power of the federal government generally; they fundamentally
alter the President’s power vis-à-vis Congress and the courts.31
Through war, Clinton and his fellow Anti-Federalists charged,
a fledgling democracy would revert to the very monarchical system over which a revolution was waged.32
24. JAMES MADISON, HELVIDIUS NUMBER IV (1793), reprinted in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794: TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING 87 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007).
25. Id.
26. TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: WRITINGS OF HERBERT J. STORING
37 (Joseph M. Bessette ed., 1995).
27. See generally GARY L. GREGG, THINKING ABOUT THE PRESIDENCY:
DOCUMENTS AND ESSAYS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT 7 (2005).
28. See generally 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing
ed., 1981).
29. CATO, TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1787), reprinted
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 28, at 116.
30. GREGG, supra note 27, at 7.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id.
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The Founders’ concerns have persisted for over two centuries. They reappeared a generation later in Joseph Story’s
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States.33 They
constituted a central preoccupation in the Civil War writings of
William Whiting, who sought to both understand and defend
Lincoln’s wartime rule.34 Writing in the wake of the Second
World War and Franklin Roosevelt’s reign in office, presidency
scholars such as Edward Corwin and Clinton Rossiter argued
that presidents exert a degree of influence over foreign and
domestic policy during times of war that is unimaginable during times of peace; and, not coincidentally, that the courts have
done very little to check this expansion.35 More recently, historians such as Arthur Schlesinger and Stephen Graubard have
suggested that wars, throughout the nation’s history, have fundamentally altered the executive machinery of government.36
And contemporary deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq have
sparked renewed discussions of an “imperial presidency, redux”
and its implications for our system of governance.37 In 1956,
Rossiter nicely summarized conventional wisdom on the topic:
it has become an “axiom of political science,” he noted, that
“great emergencies in the life of a constitutional state bring an

33. See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES, 546–80 (photo. reprint 1987) (Boston, Hilliard, Gray &

Co. 1833).
34. WILLIAM WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 17–61 (10th ed. 1971).
35. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1948,
at 275–318 (3d ed. 1948); CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 82–
111 (1956).
36. STEPHEN GRAUBARD, COMMAND OF OFFICE: HOW WAR, SECRECY AND
DECEPTION TRANSFORMED THE PRESIDENCY FROM THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO
GEORGE W. BUSH 3–32 (2004); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 35–68 (1973).
37. See Arthur Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency Redux, WASH. POST,
June 28, 2003, at A25; see also MATTHEW CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG,
PRESIDENTIAL POWER: UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED 178–215 (2007); PETER
IRONS, WAR POWERS: HOW THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY HIJACKED THE CONSTITUTION 120–32 (2005); JAMES P. PFIFFNER, POWER PLAY: THE BUSH PRESIDENCY AND THE CONSTITUTION 84 –194 (2008); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER:
THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 10–37 (2007); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, WAR AND THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 45–69 (2004); FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ & AZIZ Z.
HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF
TERROR 153–200 (2007).
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increase in executive power and prestige, always at least temporarily, more often than not permanently.”38
If Rossiter’s observation warrants the status of social
scientific axiom—and there are reasons to believe otherwise39—
one naturally wonders exactly how it came to be such. From
where does this wartime expansion of presidential power originate? Contenders certainly include the voting habits of a deferential Congress, the willingness of leaders of both parties to
affirm executive authority, and the propensity of an impressionable public to rally behind its President. But Rossiter’s
axiom also may implicate the courts. Scholars have long suggested, and many have explicitly recommended, that judges
and Justices who evaluate directives issued by presidents openly reflect upon the incidence of war, and in so doing, they often
grant the President greater discretion to pursue policy ends
during periods of war than during times of peace.40
B. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN
WAR
When trying to advance a domestic or foreign policy agenda during times of war, what powers can presidents draw from
the Constitution? Very few, at least explicitly. In its design of
the office of the presidency, the Constitution is quite precise
about some matters. It specifies exactly how the President and
Vice-President will be elected,41 who can run for office,42 and
who can vote,43 the precise day on which a newly elected President will take office,44 and the terms by which the President’s
salary can be adjusted.45 None of these matters, though, address the actual powers that presidents can exercise once in office. Compared to the clear litany of responsibilities granted to

38. ROSSITER, supra note 35, at 64 –65.
39. William Howell & Tana Johnson, War’s Contributions to Presidential
Power, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE U.S. PRESIDENCY (forthcoming by
George Edwards & William Howell eds., 2009).
40. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 36, at 141 (discussing the role of
the presidential power during the Korean War).
41. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
42. Id.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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Congress,46 the constitutional bases for presidential power,
whether during war or peace, are deeply ambiguous.
Consider, for instance, how the Constitution distributes
authority over the waging of war. On the one hand, the Constitution gives Congress the power to: “declare War, grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures
on Land and Water;”47 “raise and support Armies;”48 “provide
and maintain a Navy;”49 “make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces;”50 “provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;”51 and “provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining, the Militia.”52 The President, by contrast, is: “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States;”53 and may
“appoint Ambassadors, and other public Ministers.”54 Accounting for either the number or specificity of war powers granted,
a plain reading of the Constitution hardly affords the President
a deep reservoir of authority on matters involving war.
For purposes of assessing presidential power in wartime,
though, the key question has less to do with the prosecution of
a war, and more to do with the President’s ability to develop
and implement his domestic and foreign policy agenda while it
is waged. Here again, though, a superficial reading of the Constitution hardly supports the contention that presidents have
at their disposal vast powers to govern the country during periods of war. The Constitution, after all, says precious little
about what presidents can do when the life of the nation is imperiled. Nowhere, for instance, does the Constitution recognize
anything akin to Locke’s prerogative powers, with which presidents can act without statutory authorization, and in some cas-

46. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing numerous powers conferred on
Congress).
47. Id. cl. 11.
48. Id. cl. 12.
49. Id. cl. 13.
50. Id. cl. 14.
51. Id. cl. 15.
52. Id. cl. 16.
53. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
54. Id. cl. 2.

HOWELL_4fmt

2009]

4/18/2009 4:56 PM

WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL POWER

1787

es against it, in order to preserve a larger public good.55 According to Jeffrey Tulis, the Founders “did not choose to make provisions for the institutional encouragement of demagoguery in
time of crisis, refusing to adopt . . . the Roman model of constitutional dictatorship for emergencies.”56 To the contrary, notes
Gary Lawson, “[t]he Constitution deals with extraordinary
times primarily through ordinary powers.”57 Indeed, the only
explicit mention that constitutional protections might be lifted
during crises concerns the suspension of habeas corpus “when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require
it.”58 This provision, though, is found in Article I, not Article
II—and hence grants wartime power to Congress rather than
the President.
On what basis, then, might one find a constitutional rationale for presidents exercising expansive powers during war?
Three sources stand out: the designation of commander in
chief, the executive power, and the Take-Care Clause. Plainly,
a veritable army of scholars has debated the bold (some would
say tyrannical) actions that presidents have taken in the name
of any one or combination of these constitutional provisions.59

55. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 237 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
56. JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 30 (1988).
57. Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common
Sense in Times of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 289, 291 (2007).
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
59. Compare HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 117–33 (1990) (discussing
the Iran-contra affair, and noting that the “pervasive national perception” that
the President must act swiftly and secretly to respond to fast-moving international events “has almost inevitably forced the executive branch into a continuing pattern of evasion of congressional restraint”), and JOHN P. MACKENZIE,
ABSOLUTE POWER: HOW THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY IS UNDERMINING
THE CONSTITUTION 55–63 (2008) (critiquing the unitary executive theory, saying it has “no basis in history or coherent thought,” but noting “it could be
called the legal philosophy of President George W. Bush,” and urging that it
“needs to be understood and resisted with a firmer grasp of the nation’s formative ideals”), and David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs,
in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19–
56 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) (“The unmistakable trend
toward executive domination of U.S. foreign affairs in the past sixty years
represents a dramatic departure from the basic scheme of the Constitution.”),
with JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 143–82 (2005) (contending, based on the Constitution’s text, structure, and history, that the President has flexible warmaking and foreign affairs powers), and Lawson, supra note 57, at 303–10
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As previously indicated, this Article neither joins nor referees
this normative debate. Rather, it makes a more basic claim:
that presidents, justified or not, exploit constitutional ambiguity to their own advantage, in the short term to advance particular policy initiatives, and in the longer term to consolidate their
power more generally. In ambiguous constitutional provisions,
presidents have found a basis upon which to exalt their position
within our system of separated powers, and to claim authority
that nowhere appears, at least explicitly, in Article II. And particularly during times of war, the Constitution’s inherent ambiguity “provide[s] the opportunity for the exercise of a residuum
of unenumerated power.”60
Consider, for starters, the title of commander in chief,
which confers upon the President primary responsibility for
waging war. Advocates of a strong President, and presidents
themselves, have long argued that this title places presidents
at the very center of war.61 Where this constitutional obligation
abuts other statutory or constitutional limitations, say these
same advocates, the former should predominate.62 After all,
Chief Justice Hughes famously argued, the power to wage war
is “a power to wage war successfully.”63 These same scholars
note that the successful prosecution of any war sometimes requires presidents to act outside the strict boundaries of statutory or constitutional authority.64 Having recognized that
“[p]eacetime procedures do not necessarily fit wartime needs,”65
advocates of a vigorous wartime presidency argue, we must
employ different standards for evaluating the conduct of presidents during periods of peace and war.66
Advocates of a “unitary” presidency similarly offer a more
expansive reading of Article II’s Vesting Clause during periods
(“[M]ore exercises of [the ‘executive Power’] will be constitutionally permissible
during crises than during normal times . . . .”).
60. RICHARD PIOUS, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 38 (1979); see also Terry
M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A
Theory, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUDS. Q. 854 –56 (1999).
61. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 36, at 141 (discussing the term
“commander-in-chief ” in relation to President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
62. Id. at 68–99.
63. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
64. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 36, at 143–44 (discussing the constitutionality of the President’s actions during the Korean War).
65. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 106 (1943) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
66. Id.

HOWELL_4fmt

2009]

4/18/2009 4:56 PM

WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL POWER

1789

of war. These scholars make much of the fact that the Constitution gives the President, and the President alone, the “executive Power.”67 The President therefore deserves wide latitude to
oversee personnel and policy within the executive branch.
When evaluating whether specific actions taken by presidents
conform to their executive power, some say, we must invariably
make decisions about the “reasonableness” of his actions—that
is, we must determine whether a president’s actions are “proportionate to the end, efficacious, and respectful of background
constraints based in rights and structure.”68 Where presidential
actions fail to meet “standards of reasonableness,”69 the courts
and Congress have an obligation to overturn them. But the
standards of reasonableness themselves, common sense dictates, must vary according to the context in which the actions
occur. Certain actions that are reasonable during war assuredly are not during peace. Hence, the executive power that the
Constitution confers upon the President necessarily, and quite
naturally, expands and contracts as the nation moves into and
out of war.
Presidents, too, must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”70 which establishes the third, and arguably most
defensible, constitutional basis for relaxing peace-time checks
on a wartime presidency. Strictly speaking, the Take-Care
Clause does not distinguish between periods of war and peace.
Because laws enacted by Congress do, though, the clause nonetheless bestows upon presidents unique opportunities to exercise power during periods of war. Congress has enacted literally
hundreds of laws that grant presidents emergency powers that
are triggered whenever the nation goes to war71—powers that
67. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EX55 (2008); Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally
Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, (2009).
68. Lawson, supra note 57, at 306. This originalist understanding of the
Vesting Clause, of course, is highly contested—so much so, in fact, that Posner
and Vermeule, whose work is the focus of Lawson’s article, openly reject it. See
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 313. Calebresi and Yoo, meanwhile, argue that the powers afforded to the unitary executive are not conditional upon
the existence of a state of emergency; quite the contrary, they argue that presidents should retain total control over the executive branch during times of
both peace and war. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 67, at 18–21.
69. For further discussion of the standards of reasonableness, see GARY
LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE 52–56 (2004).
70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
71. For an overview of laws that grant the President emergency powers
and their invocation, see HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NAECUTIVE
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allow presidents to “seize property, organize and control the
means of production, seize commodities, assign military forces
abroad, institute martial law, seize and control all transportation and communication, regulate the operation of private enterprise, restrict travel, and, in a variety of ways, control the
lives of United States citizens.”72 Indeed, so many emergency
powers sit on the books that in 1976 Congress felt compelled to
enact the National Emergencies Act, which sought to clarify the
precise conditions under which presidents could invoke emergency powers and the procedures for doing so.73
Thus reading expansive powers into vague constitutional
provisions, advocates of a powerful presidency establish the basis for a “crisis jurisprudence” that is meant to govern how
judges and Justices evaluate presidential actions taken during
times of war. The next sub-section summarizes key claims of
crisis jurisprudence. The remainder of this Article then examines whether the Supreme Court, when overturning specific
wartime actions taken by presidents, draws larger lessons
about the exercise of presidential power during times of war—
that is, whether they explicitly reject the tenets of crisis jurisprudence, and thereby strike back when they strike down.
C. CRISIS JURISPRUDENCE
An extraordinary body of work on crisis jurisprudence, one
that can only briefly be summarized here, offers a blueprint for
judicial deference during periods of war.74 Though most of the
scholarship focuses on government abridgements of individual
rights during times of war, a good deal of it implicates the President. To be sure, scholars have offered a wide range of reasons
why judges and Justices employ crisis jurisprudence.75 Its core
EMERGENCY POWERS 16–19 (2007), available at http:/www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/natsec/98-505.pdf.
72. Id. at 4.
73. Id. at 12; see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
74. For useful recent summaries, see sources cited supra note 9.
75. Explanations for the persistence of crisis jurisprudence vary widely,
with different scholars emphasizing different determinants. Some focus on
judicial concerns that the President might be especially prone to ignoring objectionable court rulings during times of war. See, e.g., HOWELL, supra note 21,
at 136–75; SMITH, supra note 18, at 261–87; PHILIPPA STRUM, THE SUPREME
COURT AND “POLITICAL QUESTIONS” 130–40 (1974). Another scholar emphasizes the tendency of judges, like some elected officials, to exaggerate the threat
faced by the nation. Wells, supra note 8, at 922. Still others highlight the informational and tactical advantages of the executive and legislative branches
TIONAL
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thesis, though, can be stated quite simply: when the life of the
nation is in danger, the courts (some say appropriately, others
not) grant presidents the widest possible latitude to prosecute
wars; and consequentially, at least some presidential actions—
both international and domestic—that do not survive judicial
scrutiny during times of peace do so, as a matter of course, during periods of war.
Crisis jurisprudence constitutes a direct repudiation of the
notion, periodically expressed by the Justices themselves, that
the government cannot change “a constitution, or declare it
changed, simply because it appears ill adapted to a new state of
things.”76
Quite the opposite, crisis jurisprudence insists that the
Constitution, if it is to survive, must adapt and evolve.77 The
material context in which presidents operate crucially shapes
the judiciary’s assessment of the constitutionality of their actions. And as contexts go, wars legitimate presidential action
like no other. As Justice Felix Frankfurter argued so forcefully,
“the validity of action under the war power must be judged
wholly in the context of war. That action is not to be stigmatized as lawless because like action in times of peace would be
lawless.”78
The precise bounds of the argument, of course, remain vigorously disputed. Most concede that crisis jurisprudence does
not imply the utter dissolution of constitutional checks on presidential power during times of war.79 Wars do not permit the
in meeting foreign crises. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 313–21.
Others highlight the tendency of judges to rally behind their President. See
Joel B. Grossman, The Japanese American Cases and the Vagaries of Constitutional Adjudication in Wartime: An Institutional Perspective, 19 U. HAW. L.
REV. 687–95 (1997). Finally, going one step further, Melvin Urofsky notes Justices’ proclivity to participate in the war efforts themselves. See Melvin I.
Urofsky, Inter Arma Silent Leges: Extrajudicial Activity, Patriotism, and the
Rule of Law, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW 26–36 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew
eds., 2002).
76. People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 127 (1865).
77. See Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 4 –6 (explaining why the Supreme
Court alters its constitutional analysis under conditions of national threat).
78. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
79. See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Silence During War 1 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with New York University), available at
http://www.nyu.edu/classes/nbeck/q2/king.propensity.pdf (finding that when
the country is at war, the probability that the Supreme Court upholds a civil
rights or liberties claim drops by only fifteen percent).
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transformation of presidents into dictators. But they do permit
a reasonably large number of actions that, during times of
peace, would not pass constitutional muster. Consider the long
list of allowances endorsed by Justice George Sutherland:
To the end that war may not result in defeat, freedom of speech may,
by act of Congress, be curtailed or denied so that the morale of the
people and the spirit of the army may not be broken by seditious utterances; freedom of the press curtailed to preserve our military plans
and movements from the knowledge of the enemy; deserters and spies
put to death without indictment or trial by jury; ships and supplies
requisitioned; property of alien enemies, theretofore under the protection of the Constitution, seized without due process of law in the ordinary sense of that term; prices of food and other necessities of life
fixed or regulated; railways taken over and operated by the government; and other drastic powers, wholly inadmissible in time of peace,
exercised to meet the emergencies of war.80

Presidents may not achieve everything they want during
times of war. But if Sutherland’s sentiments are shared by other Justices, presidents ought to achieve a significantly higher
proportion of policy victories during war than they do during
peace. Consequentially, as Edward Corwin puts it:
War does not of itself render constitutional limitations liable to outright suspension by either Congress or President, but does frequently
make them considerably less stiff—the war emergency infiltrates
them and renders them pliable. Earlier constitutional absolutism is
replaced by constitutional relativity: it all depends . . . [on] what the
Supreme Court finds to be reasonable in the circumstances.81

Crisis jurisprudence thereby puts Justices into the business of assessing the size and imminence of foreign threats,
and of gauging the extent to which presidential policies effectively address them. As Justice Black argued in the majority
opinion to Korematsu v. United States, the much-maligned decision that upheld President Roosevelt’s executive order placing
Japanese Americans in internment camps, “[w]hen, under conditions of modern warfare, our shores are threatened by hostile
forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the
threatened danger.”82 Consequentially, crisis jurisprudence
demands greater deference for larger wars and dictates that
judges look more favorably upon presidential policies that are
more closely linked to the war efforts themselves.83 Assuredly,
80. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931).
81. CORWIN, supra note 16, at 80.
82. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220.
83. See Garrison, supra note 9, at 166 (“This view of judicial decisionmaking assumes that, when called upon to curtail executive and legislative
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presidents cannot free themselves from constitutional or statutory shackles by sending a handful of troops abroad. Nor can
presidents, when waging larger wars, claim extraconstitutional powers to reshape policies that have nothing to
do with the military campaign itself. But when exerting power
that is commensurate with an external threat, and when advancing policies that qualitatively improve the nation’s chances
of prevailing over that threat, presidents can proceed with
some confidence that the judiciary will not stand in their way.
Nevertheless, crisis jurisprudence remains a prescriptive
theory of judicial behavior, and it is not a formal rule or doctrine that Justices must follow. When arguing their case before
the Supreme Court, counsel for the President regularly plead
with the Justices to grant due deference to the President during periods of war.84 The Justices, though, are entirely free to
disregard such pleas, to forswear crisis jurisprudence, and to
evaluate presidential wartime initiatives exactly as if they had
been issued during peace. Whether crisis jurisprudence has influenced the content of court rulings is therefore entirely an
empirical question.
D. EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR CRISIS JURISPRUDENCE
Much of the literature on crisis jurisprudence assumes that
judges defer to the President during periods of war,85 and then
sets about trying to identify why this is so. From this scholarship, though, it is difficult to know just how pervasive—some
would say insidious—crisis jurisprudence actually is. We simply lack the evidence required to evaluate when judges behave in
ways that are consistent with the predictions of crisis jurisprudence and when instead they forsake the exigencies of war and
check the exercise of presidential power. Three studies come
close, but none offers a definitive answer.
infringement of civil liberties during times of war and national crisis, the
courts will fail to do so and take a very deferential and muted posture toward
the actions of the other political branches.”).
84. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 92 (1866) (recounting
government counsel’s argument that the Court should defer to the will of the
commander in chief when it comes to decisions made in times of war).
85. But see Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 28–29. These counterclaims,
however, are in the minority. As Epstein and her colleagues recognize, “the
crisis thesis is sufficiently convincing to the vast majority of members of the
legal community that one version or another has made its way into judicial
opinions and off-the-bench writing of Court members.” Id. at 36.
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Methodologically, Lee Epstein and her colleagues have
written the best quantitative study on crisis jurisprudence.86
Surveying the universe of Supreme Court cases involving civil
liberties during the latter half of the twentieth century, Epstein
and her co-authors find substantial evidence that the courts do
in fact take a narrower view of individual rights during periods
of war.87 Interestingly though, they find that the courts are
more likely to overturn policies that directly involve a war effort and that infringe upon individual rights.88 Unfortunately,
these findings speak only tangentially to issues involving presidential power. Many of the cases in their data set concern
challenges to laws enacted by Congress, rather than policies directly advanced by presidents. Moreover, it is difficult to know
whether a particular ruling supports Congress, the President,
both, or neither. And the preponderance of presidential actions
that come before the Court are not analyzed at all.
The next two studies focus more intently on the presidency.
The political scientist Tom Clark examined appellate court rulings on non-criminal cases over a one-hundred-year-period, but
found no evidence of heightened judicial deference to the executive during periods of war.89 In fact, Clark’s findings suggest
that appellate judges are significantly more likely to rule
against the President during wartime.90 He concludes that
“constitutional checks and balances placed on executive power
do not necessarily collapse during wartime.”91
Finally, in earlier research, I investigated every executive
order that was challenged on constitutional or statutory
grounds in a federal court between 1942 and 1998.92 I found
that courts affirm executive orders eighty-three percent of the
time, and so doing, they occasionally provide justification for
further expansions of presidential power.93 I unearthed no evi86. Id. at 6–10 (introducing the different components of their methodology).
87. Id. at 109 (“We show that war causes the Court to decide cases unrelated to the war in a markedly more conservative direction than they otherwise would.”).
88. Id.
89. See Tom S. Clark, Judicial Decision Making During Wartime, 3 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 397–419 (2006).
90. Id. at 416.
91. Id.
92. See HOWELL, supra note 21, at 151–74.
93. Id. at 154 –55.
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dence, however, that either the frequency of court challenges or
the propensity of judges to side with the President systematically varies according to whether the country is at war.94
Whatever their merits, these latter two studies hardly form
the last word on the judiciary’s treatment of the presidency
during periods of war. And they certainly do not disprove
claims about the pervasiveness of crisis jurisprudence. It is
quite possible that judges hear very different types of cases
during times of war than during times of peace, even if the size
of their caseloads remains roughly constant. On especially
high-profile cases, judges may delay rendering a decision until
after a military conflict has subsided; and Supreme Court Justices, of course, may refuse to grant certiorari in cases that
would certainly command their attention during periods of
peace. Neither study, moreover, examines the universe of Supreme Court challenges to presidential power over an extended
time period. Recognizing the limitations of the existing quantitative work on the topic, Clark cautions that “much further
analysis [is required] before a broad claim may be staked about
the nature of non-criminal adjudication during wartime.”95
II. THREE LANDMARK SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON
PRESIDENTIAL POWER
The federal judiciary has not been shy about overturning
policies backed by wartime presidents. Since 1933, in fact, the
Supreme Court has ruled against the government in thirtynine percent of the 691 wartime cases to which the U.S. government was a direct party; and the Supreme Court ruled
against the government in roughly thirty percent of those wartime cases that were argued by the Solicitor General, whose
presence may reveal aspects of the President’s views about a
case’s importance.96 For the government generally, and the
President in particular, war-time losses in the courts are not a
rare occurrence. For the scholarly interest that they have attracted though, three judicial challenges to presidential war
powers stand above all others. This section carefully reviews
94. Id. at 166–67 (illustrating how individual judges vote on challenges to
presidential actions pertaining to war).
95. See Clark, supra note 89, at 416.
96. To verify the percentages used in this data set, see The Judicial Research Initiative, Research Databases and Data Archives, http://www.cas.sc
.edu/poli/juri/databases.htm; see also WILLIAM HOWELL, IN TIMES OF WAR:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY (forthcoming).
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each for what they say about the judiciary’s understanding of
the relationship between war and presidential power.
A. EX PARTE MILLIGAN
Controversy in Ex parte Milligan centered on the fate of
Lamdin P. Milligan, who at the Civil War’s height in 1864 had
been arrested at his home in Indiana and charged with conspiracy against the Government of the United States, inciting
insurrection, giving aid and comfort to the Southern enemy,
and violating the laws of war.97 According to the U.S. military
Commandant of the District of Indiana, Milligan had been participating in a plot to liberate Confederate prisoners of war and,
eventually, to overthrow the state governments of Indiana,
Ohio, and Michigan.98 For these crimes, Milligan was tried in a
system of military commissions that President Abraham Lincoln had unilaterally created in 1862.99 Unlike civilian courts,
military commissions denied defendants the opportunity to be
present during the proceedings and to receive a jury trial.100
The military commission found Milligan guilty and sentenced
him to death.101
Fortuitously for Milligan, the Civil War ended just before
his scheduled hanging on May 19, 1865.102 The exigencies of
war having subsided, Milligan’s lawyers promptly appealed his
sentence.103 The circuit court’s two-judge panel, however, could
not come to any resolution over the essential issues of the case,
namely: whether an 1863 congressional statute gave the President the necessary authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and try citizens in military commissions rather than civilian courts;104 whether a civilian court had jurisdiction to hear

97. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6 (1866).
98. Id. at 6–7.
99. Id. at 6.
100. Id. at 29–30.
101. Id. at 7.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 7–8.
104. An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (1863). According to the President,
this Act effectively codified the President’s unilateral creations of military
commissions in 1861. Counsel for Milligan, however, argued that Congress did
not contemplate, and hence did not authorize, the trial of U.S. citizens outside
of civilian courts. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 30–32.
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an appeal from a military commission;105 and whether a civilian court could discharge a defendant from custody.106
In 1866, the case came before the Supreme Court, which
sided with Milligan.107 According to the Court, neither the 1863
statute nor local conditions in Indiana justified the imposition
of martial law or the creation of military tribunals.108 The
Court further ruled that as a United States citizen with no military experience who inhabited a Northern state quite distant
from the war’s primary hostilities, Milligan retained the right
to be tried in a civilian court.109 The Court then found the substantive allegations against Milligan sufficiently weak as to
warrant his immediate release from custody.110
At the time, much of the press and public viewed the
Court’s ruling as a setback for Republican members of Congress who, over the continued resistance of President Andrew
Johnson, sought to reconstruct the South.111 In particular, proRepublican newspapers condemned the decision as “judicial tyranny,” “the most dangerous opinion ever pronounced by that
tribunal,” and a “sorry attempt of five not so very distinguished
persons to exhibit themselves as profound jurists, whereas they
have only succeeded in proving themselves to be very poor politicians.”112 The New York Herald called the Court “a relic of the
past, nine old superior pettifoggers, old marplots, a formidable
barrier to the consummation of the great revolution.”113 The
Cleveland Herald compared the ruling to the Dred Scott decision;114 the Chicago Tribune claimed that the decision would do
little to improve the unfavorable impression of the Court;115
and the Washington Chronicle openly accused the Justices of
treason.116 The New York Times lamented that instead of supporting “the common sense doctrine that the Constitution pro105. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 9–11.
106. Id. at 31–32.
107. Id. at 134 –42.
108. Id. at 134.
109. Id. at 134 –35.
110. Id. at 135.
111. See, e.g., 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 211–12, 219 (1971); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 430–33 (2d ed. 1926).
112. See WARREN, supra note 111, at 430–31.
113. See id. at 432 n.1.
114. See id. at 432.
115. See FAIRMAN, supra note 111, at 218.
116. See WARREN, supra note 111, at 433.
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vides for the permanence of the Union,” the Court “throws the
great weight of its influence into the scale of those who assailed
the Union and step after step impugned the constitutionality of
nearly everything that was done to uphold it.”117
Quickly, though, the case’s importance would transcend
the political struggles occurring in the aftermath of the Civil
War. For many, Milligan would emerge as a monument to judicial checks on presidential war powers, and as a rejection of the
notion that there exists, as John Quincy Adams argued in 1831,
a “war power” that is “limited by regulation and restricted by
provision in the Constitution” and a “peace power” that is “only
limited by the usages of nations.”118 In the period between
World Wars I and II, Charles Warren praised the decision as
“one of the bulwarks of American liberty,”119 that “has since
been recognized by all men as the palladium of the rights of the
individual,”120 and that dealt “a staggering blow to the plans for
the use of the military forces in the process of Reconstruction
then being matured by Congress.”121 And at century’s end,
Chief Justice William Rehnquist criticized the Court’s opinion
for having introduced arguments that were not pertinent to the
specific controversy at hand but also admitted that the decision
“is justly celebrated for its rejection of the government’s position that the Bill of Rights has no application in wartime.”122
According to Oren Gross, Milligan is the paradigmatic example of the “Business as Usual” model of judicial decision
making.123 Indeed, for Gross, it is the only Supreme Court case
to warrant an extended discussion of this model. In contrast to
theories of “accommodation,” the Business-as-Usual model
postulates that judges interpret the Constitution the same way

117. Id. at 429.
118. CORWIN, supra note 16, at 78. This notion also comports with Lincoln’s conception of presidential war powers. For longer discussions on Lincoln, see CORWIN, supra note 35, at 275–83. See also DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 115–43 (2003); CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 273–87 (1943).
119. WARREN, supra note 111, at 427.
120. Id. at 432.
121. Id. at 423.
122. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 137 (1998).
123. See Gross, supra note 8, at 1043; see also Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385–433 (1989); Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 8, at 15–18 (describing the “civil libertarian view” of
wartime jurisprudence).
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during periods of war and peace.124 Essentially prescriptive, the
model dictates that:
[A] state of emergency does not justify a deviation from the ‘normal’
legal system. No special ‘emergency’ powers are introduced either on
an ad hoc or a permanent basis. The ordinary legal system already
provides the necessary answers to any crisis without the legislative or
executive assertion of new or additional government powers.125

Lee Epstein and her colleagues go further still.126 The “Milligan thesis,” they contend, not only suggests that the courts
guard basic civil liberties in times of both war and peace, but
that the courts actually subject the government to greater scrutiny during periods of war.127 As Epstein et alia argue, Milligan
stands for the fundamental proposition that “the justices must
become especially vigilant in protecting rights and liberties
during ‘commotions.’”128
Each of these characterizations of Milligan has its share of
supporting evidence. In their arguments before the Supreme
Court, all three of Milligan’s attorneys insisted that his case
had more to do with presidential war powers than it did with a
single man’s fate.129 According to David Field, constitutional
checks on presidential power “were made for a state of war as
well as a state of peace.”130 James Garfield, who would assume
the presidency fifteen years later, pleaded with the Court not to
let the Constitution be “lost in war.”131 And if the British King
lacked the power to “stretch the royal authority far enough to
justify military trials,” as Attorney General Jeremiah Black argued, then surely the President could not read the Constitution

124. See Gross, supra note 8, at 1044 (“The Business as Usual model rejects
the possibility that a tension exists between protecting the security of the nation and maintaining its basic democratic values, including the rule of law.”).
125. Gross, supra note 8, at 1043.
126. See Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 6–8 (explaining the need for a more
vigorous study of Supreme Court decisions during war and peace).
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id. (using the term “commotions” to describe “major international
events, including war, that threaten the security of the nation”).
129. See BROOK THOMAS, CIVIC MYTHS 109 (2007) (“Milligan’s attorneys
argued that their client had been denied rights by the Constitution and that
those rights could not be suspended during wartime.”).
130. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MILLIGAN CASE (1867), reprinted in 1
SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY
FIELD 38 (A.P. Sprague ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1884).
131. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 47 (1866).
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as granting the requisite authority to do so.132 After all, Black
famously argued, the Constitution “does not carry the seeds of
destruction in its own bosom.”133
According to Milligan’s counsel, it was the province of the
Court to ensure that presidential actions during times of war
comply with the Constitution—which, they claimed, conferred
on the President rather limited war powers in Article II. Consistent with how Epstein et alia would later characterize Milligan, Black noted that:
[I]t is precisely in a time of war and civil commotion that we should
double the guards upon the Constitution. In peaceable and quiet
times, our legal rights are in little danger of being overborne; but
when the wave of power lashes itself into violence and rage, and goes
surging up against the barriers which were made to confine it, then
we need the whole strength of an unbroken Constitution to save us
from destruction.134

When the nation stands on a war footing, Black argued,
the courts must not cower before an energetic commander in
chief. If the Court adjusts its behavior at all during times of
war, it should do so by summoning altogether new courage to
check the exercise of presidential power.
For Justice David Davis, who would write the majority
opinion in Milligan, such appeals seemed to resonate. Having
deferred to the President repeatedly through the Civil War,135
Davis seized Milligan as an opportunity to reclaim authority
during peacetime that had been lost during the war. Though
Milligan’s case was but one of many circulating through the
federal judiciary, the Court saw fit to use it as an opportunity
to vaunt the Constitution as working “equally in war and in
peace,” protecting “all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances.”136 To argue otherwise, Davis seemed to say,
was to accept the notion that the Constitution functioned much
132. JEREMIAH S. BLACK, ARGUMENT IN BEHALF OF LAMBDIN P. MILLIGAN,
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1866), reprinted in 2 LEGAL
MASTERPIECES 944 (Van Vechten Veeder ed., 1903).
133. THOMAS, supra note 129, at 109.
134. ESSAYS AND SPEECHES OF JEREMIAH S. BLACK 525 (Chauncey F.

Black ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1885).
135. In Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152–53 (1861), the Court did
attempt to curtail the President’s ability to detain U.S. citizens. Lincoln, however, refused to comply with the judicial order, and in every subsequent case
that challenged his prosecution of the war, the Court deferred to the executive
branch. See, e.g., Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 248 (1863);
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671 (1863).
136. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–21 (1866).
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like a gas lamp, to be turned on and off at a single man’s discretion. But Davis and four of his colleagues expressly rejected
such a notion:
No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of [the Constitution’s] provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the
theory on which it is based is false; for the government, within the
Constitution, has all the powers granted to it which are necessary to
preserve its existence.137

At first glance, this seems like a sharp rejection of crisis jurisprudence. But a closer look reveals that the Court’s majority
opinion in Milligan also is steeped in practical considerations
about the President’s ability to lead the nation during times of
war. The opinion hints that if the world looked different than it
did in either 1866, when the Court rendered its opinion, or in
1864, when Milligan was arrested and sentenced, then Milligan
might well have swung from the gallows.138
From the outset, the Justices suggested that their very willingness to take the case depended upon the war’s cessation.
The opening lines of Justice Davis’s opinion admitted that “during the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not
allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary
to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial question.”139 With the
return of peace, though, “considerations of safety” need not be
intermingled with “the exercise of power,” and at long last the
Court could review a case without “the admixture of any element not required to form a legal opinion.”140 The opinion that
Davis would write, though, was not purely legal. With the nation reunified, the Court continued to measure presidential
power against the exigencies of war.
In his argument on behalf of the federal government, Benjamin Butler had emphasized the importance of accommodating a more expansive view of presidential power. He noted:
In carrying on war, when in the judgment of him to whom the country
has entrusted its welfare—whose single word, as commander of the
army, can devote to death thousands of its bravest and best sons—we
give to him, when necessity demands, the discretion to govern, out137. Id. at 121.
138. Id. at 122 (explaining that had Milligan simply been tried according to
the laws of Indiana, he still could have been found guilty and punished appropriately).
139. Id. at 109.
140. Id.
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side of the ordinary forms and constitutional limits of law, the wicked
and disloyal within the military lines.141

Although the Court ultimately ruled against the government, elements of Davis’s opinion gave credence to Butler’s
claims. In particular, Davis implied that the Court would have
ruled differently had Milligan been arrested and tried in Virginia rather than Indiana.142 This did not reflect concerns
about the constitutionality of military commissions per se, but
rather an assessment of whether or not local conditions permitted the conduct of a fair and open trial in a civilian court. In
Indiana, Davis noted, the civilian courts continued to operate;
the state government allied itself with the North; and the theater of military operations remained distant.143 Had any of these
facts differed, Davis might have recognized the need for martial
law and the operation of military commissions and hence would
have upheld Milligan’s death sentence.144
Davis further weighed the material threat that Milligan
posed to the cause of the North. The Justice made much of the
facts that Milligan was a U.S. citizen; had lived in the Northern
state of Indiana for 20 years; had never been convicted of a
crime; and had never served in the military.145 Indeed, he repeated these facts several times in his opinion.146 One can interpret these comments as indicative of the Court’s views on
Milligan’s guilt or innocence. Or, alternatively, one can read
these elements of the opinion as saying that threats to national
security do justify extra-constitutional actions by presidents.
The threats just need to be sufficiently grave for the Court to
sanction such actions.

141. Id. at 92.
142. Id. at 127 (“Because, during the late Rebellion, it could have been enforced in Virginia, where the national authority was overturned and the courts
driven out, it does not follow that it should obtain in Indiana, where that authority was never disputed, and justice was always administered.”).
143. Id. at 126.
144. Davis noted:
There are occasions when martial rule can be properly applied. If, in
foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is
impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on
the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails,
there is necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus
overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society.
Id. at 127.
145. Id. at 7.
146. Davis begins his opinion by asserting these facts. See id. at 107–08.
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In his dissent, meanwhile, Chief Justice Chase openly endorsed the central tenets of crisis jurisprudence. According to
Chase, the appropriate scope of governmental power—initiated
by Congress, executed by the President—critically depended
upon the circumstances in which the nation found itself. For
Chief Justice Chase, war, above all other factors, augments
state power:
Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail. . . . [But] when the
nation is involved in war . . . it is within the power of Congress to determine in what states or districts such great and imminent public
danger exists as justifies the authorization of military tribunals for
the trial of crimes and offences against the discipline or security of
the arm or against the public safety.147

Chase openly rejected the idea that presidents, during
times of war, could unilaterally create military tribunals.148
But as long as Congress sanctioned his actions, the President
could create alternative court systems that would survive judicial scrutiny during periods of war, though perhaps not during
times of peace.
To be sure, Davis’s majority opinion contains strong language, almost all of it dicta, indicating support for constitutional limits on presidential power and distrust of any president
who would use war as a pretext for aggrandizing his own authority. But the opinion also contains repeated references to a
host of practical considerations about the President’s ability to
prosecute war, and, by inference, the deference that the Court
ought to grant him. Moreover, Chief Justice Chase, along with
three other Justices, simply rejected the claim that the Constitution is anything but a fluid document that affords greater
powers to the government generally, and Congress and the
President in particular, during times of war.149 When national
security concerns are sufficiently acute, or when a perceived
threat to a war’s prosecution is sufficiently great, the Court, in
its discretion, may decide to grant the adjoining branches of
government allowances that it would promptly retract during
peaceful times. That it chose not to for Lamdin Milligan does
not undermine the general proposition that wars can only aid,
147. Id. at 140.
148. Id. at 140–42 (arguing that only Congress has the authority to provide
for the organization of a military commission).
149. Edward Corwin therefore summarized the lessons of the case this
way: “the Bill of Rights could be suspended in wartime if, in the controlling
judgment of Congress, the war effort and public safety required it.” CORWIN,
supra note 16, at 80.
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and can never hurt, presidents in their quest to expand their
base of power.
B. YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. V. SAWYER
After affirming some of the most extraordinary exercises of
presidential power in World War II, the Supreme Court rebuked the President right at the height of the Korean War. The
occasion centered on a long-standing labor-management dispute. When in April of 1952 the Federal Wage Stabilization
Board failed to broker an agreement between the steel industries and their employees, the United Steel Workers of America
announced its intention to launch a nationwide strike.150 In response, President Truman issued executive order 10340, which
directed Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to immediately seize the steel mills and ensure their continued operation.151
After initially complying with the executive order, the owners
of the steel mills challenged its constitutionality in the federal
courts.152
Just one month after Truman issued his executive order,
the Supreme Court heard arguments in the case.153 Lawyers for
the steel mills argued that the President’s order amounted to
an unconstitutional commandeering of private property and a
usurpation of Congress’s legislative authority.154 Moreover, the
President’s actions arguably violated the basic procedures for
reconciling labor-management disputes in the 1947 Labor
Management Relations Act, more popularly known as TaftHartley.155 President Truman’s counsel responded that the order, though not expressly authorized by statute or the Constitution, was needed in order to avert a national catastrophe.156

150. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582–83
(1952).
151. Id. at 583.
152. Id.
153. Truman entered his order on April 9, 1952. Id. Responding promptly
due to the importance of the issues raised, the Court heard arguments on the
case starting May 12, 1952. Id. at 584.
154. See id. at 582 (“The mill owners argue that the President’s order
amounts to lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the President.”).
155. See id. at 586 (“[T]he [labor-management dispute] plan that Congress
adopted in [the Taft-Hartley] Act did not provide for seizure under any circumstances.”).
156. Id. at 582.
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The government’s effort to wage war in Korea, after all, critically depended upon the uninterrupted production of steel.157
In a 6-3 ruling, the Court found in favor of the mill owners.158 Each of the Justices in the majority wrote a separate
concurring opinion, a fact that suggests that each was motivated by a slightly different set of considerations. For many,
though, one central fact proved dispositive: when debating TaftHartley, members of Congress had considered, and rejected, an
amendment that would have granted the President the power
to directly intervene in labor-management disputes when the
nation was at war.159 Consequently, the will of Congress
seemed to expressly prohibit the specific actions of President
Truman. And as Justice Robert Jackson recognized in his nowfamous concurrence, presidential power reaches its nadir when
in direct opposition to the wishes of Congress.160
The media initially characterized Youngstown as a stunning rebuke of Truman’s authority, and of the notion that presidents during times of emergency possess powers not explicitly
recognized in either the Constitution or in statute. A New York
Times editorial described the decision as “a redefinition of the
powers of the President” that “deliberately checked” the “trend
towards indefinite expansion of the Chief Executive’s authority” and “minimize[d] the implied powers of the Presidency.”161
Likewise, the Los Angeles Times editorial page characterized
the decision as Truman’s “severest rebuff” from the Court,
which found that “the President has no ‘inherent powers’ which
enable him to make law to suit himself either in an emergency
or at any other time.”162
157. See Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 10, 1952) (noting
how “steel is an indispensable component of substantially all” weapons and
materials used by the armed forces).
158. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589 (“[The] seizure order cannot stand.”).
159. See id. at 586 (discussing Congress’s refusal to adopt governmental
seizure as a method of settling labor disputes).
160. See id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”).
161. Steel: Theory and Practice, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1952, at 28; see also
Arthur Krock, In the Nation: A Lesson for Critics of the American System, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 1952, at 30 (describing the significance of the decision considering “five of the six justices in the majority held against the leader of their party and the executive power from which they had received their appointments”).
162. Truman Gets His Severest Rebuff, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1952, at A4.
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As in Milligan, elements of Youngstown reject the idea that
presidents can freely claim powers during times of war that are
unavailable to them during periods of peace. Justice Hugo
Black, writing for the majority, suggested that Truman’s greatest error consisted of usurping Congress’s lawmaking powers.163 The problem was not that private property was seized by
the government; it was that the President, rather than Congress, ordered the seizure. “In both good times and bad,” Black
concluded, Congress alone retains the lawmaking power that is
required to address the sorts of problems posed by the threatened steel workers strike.164 No overriding public purpose, including the successful prosecution of a foreign war, justified the
president’s unilateral assumption of lawmaking authority.165
Checks on the independent exercise of presidential power
during times of war also appear in the concurring opinions in
Youngstown. Justice William Douglas began his opinion thus:
“There can be no doubt that the emergency which caused the
President to seize these steel plants was one that bore heavily
on the country. But the emergency did not create power; it
merely marked an occasion when power should be exercised.”166
Justice Jackson further worried that presidents might use wars
as a pretext for asserting new controls over the conduct of domestic affairs. No president, he argued, can justifiably “enlarge
his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own
commitment of the Nation’s armed forces to some foreign venture.”167
While Justices in the majority challenged the President’s
unilateral policymaking, dissenting Justices emphasized the
importance of presidential leadership during periods of war.
Indeed, the strong view that emergencies afford presidents absolutely no additional power was in the distinct minority, as
each of the concurring opinions offered exceptions to such a
claim, and several (along with the three dissents) explicitly rejected it.168 While extolling a rather narrow interpretation of
163. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 588 (emphasizing that the “Constitution does not subject [the]
lawmaking power of Congress to presidential . . . supervision or control,” even
when “[t]he power of Congress to adopt such public policies . . . is beyond question”).
166. Id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring).
168. See infra notes 169–75 and accompanying text.
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the Constitution’s Commander-in-Chief Clause, Justice Jackson admitted that the Constitution itself might be unworkable
if the Justices failed to “indulge some latitude of interpretation
for changing times.”169 Justice Tom Clark openly endorsed the
view that presidential power naturally, and unavoidably, expands during periods of crisis: “[T]he Constitution does grant to
the President extensive authority in times of grave and imperative national emergency. In fact, to my thinking, such a grant
may well be necessary to the very existence of the Constitution
itself.”170
In fact, the Justices expressly held open the possibility that
they would uphold some presidential actions during periods of
war, even though these same actions would not withstand judicial scrutiny during times of peace. While finding this particular executive order unconstitutional, Justice Felix Frankfurter
refused to “define the President’s powers comprehensively.”171
But at various points, the Justices in the majority nonetheless
suggested that they might have ruled differently had Congress
at least formally authorized the military action,172 or had the
Korean War approached the size of either of the first two world
wars.173 From the vantage point of the Justices in the majority,
the Korean War simply did not amount to a sufficiently pressing national security threat to justify the President’s seizure of
the steel mills.174 But by recognizing that “the President’s inde169. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 613 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (recognizing the “powers that
flow from declared war”).
173. Id. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring) (recognizing that the current seizure did not result from “a military command addressed by the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, to a mobilized nation waging, or imminently threatened
with, total war”). Reflecting on this case nearly a half century later, Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted the significance of Truman’s decision to call the
Korean War a “police action” rather than a war that required Congress’s formal authorization. He then concluded that “I think that if the steel seizure
had taken place during the Second World War, the government probably
would have won the case under the constitutional grant of the war power to
the president.” WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 191 (Alfred A.
Knopf 2001) (1987); see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the
Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 (1993) (noting the “sweeping claim of
presidential prerogative” that President Roosevelt enjoyed during World War
II).
174. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring) (“The
present situation is not comparable to that of an imminent invasion or threatened attack.”).
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pendent power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation
confronting the nation,”175 the Court held open the possibility
that at least some wars might permit, or even require, precisely
the kinds of actions that Truman himself took in 1952.
Within the context of the Korean War, one can well imagine still more changes to the case’s facts that might have elicited a different ruling. One wonders, for instance, how the
Justices might have ruled had: it been employees of a weapons
manufacturer, rather than a steel industry, who threatened to
strike; clearer evidence of a steel shortage existed; the threatened strike came on more suddenly, and the prospective of a
resolution appeared dimmer; or a more convincing case been
made that success on the battlefield critically depended upon
the continued operation of the mills. According to Maeva Marcus, “the majority of the Court appeared unconvinced that the
necessity for the seizure was as great as the administration
claimed,” in part because the government was still allocating
steel for recreational purposes and substantial inventories of
steel were reportedly on hand.176 Indeed, according to some observers at the time, the country had enough steel for defense
projects for at least thirty days after a strike, during which
time labor and management might have settled their differences, and the steel mills might have reopened without the need
for presidential intervention.177 Had steel supplies been scarcer, or had the strike been more disruptive, the Court might well
have affirmed Truman’s order.178
Shortly after the early and more sensationalist media reports on the case, observers began to see that Youngstown
175. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring).
176. Maeva Marcus, Presidential Power in Times of Crisis: Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), in CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:
CLASHES OVER POWER AND LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT 65, 76 (Gregg
Ivers & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2004).
177. Steel: Hands Off, WASH. POST, June 11, 1952, at 14.
178. Interestingly, editorials in the New York Times abandoned their initial interpretation of the case as a broad repudiation of presidential wartime
power, and instead began to publish a series of articles that suggested the Supreme Court left open the possibility that various mitigating circumstances
might justify the President taking extraordinary measures in future crises.
See, e.g., Arthur Krock, Editorial, Powers of a President After the Steel Case,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1952, at E3 (listing areas in the concurring opinions that
left room for the President to act without specific statutory authority); Editorial, Seizure Ends, But Strike Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1952, at E2 (describing how the Court’s decision does not necessarily “preclude extraordinary
Presidential action in [future] times[s] of emergency”).
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plainly did not cage the wartime President once and for all. Reflecting on the case in a June 5, 1952 essay, Walter Lippmann
argued that the President unquestionably retained the authority to use emergency measures should a genuinely unanticipated national emergency arise.
No one . . . has said or implied that the President cannot act to avert a
national disaster unless there is express statutory authorization for
the measures he believes he must take. If the disaster, which has to
be dealt with, is of a kind which no one has foreseen, if therefore there
is an absence of statutory law, there is no doubt at all that the President could act according to his best judgment . . . until Congress can
convene and can legislate.179

Stephen Galpin at the Wall Street Journal shared Lippmann’s perspective, claiming that “[n]one of the nine justices
contended that the President does not have some powers not
expressly spelled out in the Constitution. To contend that
would be to deny the President the power to act quickly and decisively in a real emergency . . . such as an invasion.”180
Youngstown constituted a genuine setback for Truman’s effort to wage an increasingly unpopular war in Korea. Justice
Jackson’s concurrence established, arguably, the single most
important framework for judges and Justices who would subsequently evaluate challenges to presidential power. The case,
though, hardly amounts to a wholesale repudiation of crisis jurisprudence. In this instance, a rather stunning alignment of
facts about the Korean War, the labor-management dispute,
and the legislative history of Taft-Hartley worked against the
President. But the Justices repeatedly suggested that under
slightly different circumstances, they might have upheld the
President’s wartime activities, knowing full well that they
plainly would not during times of peace.
C. BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH
Nearly 150 years after Milligan, the Supreme Court once
again evaluated the use of wartime military tribunals to try individuals suspected of either plotting or engaging in violence
against the U.S. government.181 This time, Lakhdar Boumediene stood at the center of the controversy. The federal gov179. Walter Lippmann, Op-Ed., Today and Tomorrow: The Court and the
Steel Case, WASH. POST, June 5, 1952, at 17.
180. Stephen K. Galpin, The President’s Powers: Impact of Court Ruling
Goes Beyond Its Literal Words, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1952, at 4.
181. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2229 (2008).
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ernment charged Boumediene, a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
with planning an attack on a U.S. Embassy in October of
2001.182 At the time of the Supreme Court hearing, Boumediene was held at the U.S. Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility, which, according to the Bush administration, remained outside of the jurisdiction of U.S. civilian courts.183 Boumediene v.
Bush raised questions about the legality of the detention of all
suspects held at the Guantanamo Bay military base, as well as
the constitutionality of the system of military tribunals designed to try them.
In June 2008, the Supreme Court once again repudiated
presidential assertions of power.184 In the majority opinion,
Justice Anthony Kennedy insisted that the Supreme Court
could, in fact, consider habeas appeals by Guantanamo detainees, even though Congress had stripped the U.S. civilian
courts of jurisdiction over the trials of these non-U.S. citizens.185 The Court further ruled that the operating system of
military tribunals did not afford sufficient Due Process protections and, in the Court’s judgment, would render decisions that
were prone to error.186 Boumediene thereby paved the way for
Guantanamo prisoners to challenge their detainment in civilian
courts, and set in flux a system of tribunals that had been years
in the making.
It is much too soon to evaluate Boumediene’s long-term
significance. In the near term, the case appears to have upset
the Bush administration’s anti-terrorism policies.187 As one de182. Matteo M. Winkler, When ‘Extraordinary’ Means Illegal: International
Law and European Reaction to the United States Rendition Program, 30 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 33, 61 (2008).
183. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244 (“The Government contends that
noncitizens designated as enemy combatants and detained in territory located
outside our Nation’s borders have no constitutional rights and no privilege of
habeas corpus.”).
184. Id. at 2275 (holding that the petitioners are entitled to seek the writ of
habeas corpus, and striking down Military Commissions Act Section 7 as unconstitutional).
185. Id. at 2277. The existing system of military tribunals did offer detainees limited access to civilian courts. Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs), which operated in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, were
charged with reviewing the status of individuals held at Guantanamo. Id. at
2241 (“[T]he Deputy Secretary of Defense established [CSRTs] to determine
whether individuals detained at Guantanamo were ‘enemy combatants’ . . . .”).
186. Id. at 2270.
187. See Stephen I. Vladeck, On Jurisdictional Elephants and Kangaroo
Courts, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 172, 172 (2008) (noting how the Court’s recent de-
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tainee’s defense lawyer put it, the ruling “appears to demolish
this argument that the Constitution does not apply in Guantanamo Bay.”188 Georgetown Law Professor Neal Katyal called
the decision “astounding.”189 Robert Barnes of the Washington
Post characterized the ruling as “a historic rebuke to the Bush
administration,”190 while Jonathan Mahler, a New York Times
journalist, wrote, “it seems indisputable that the court is more
powerful today than ever.”191 The Supreme Court decision dealt
“perhaps the final blow” to the President’s detainee policy, according to Boston Globe reporter Farah Stockman.192 “The
court’s majority took aim at Bush’s long-held assertion that, as
U.S. commander in chief during wartime, he has broad powers
to detain terrorist suspects as he sees fit in order to protect the
nation.”193 Legal experts agreed that Boumediene “left Bush
with few options.”194
As noted above, the Justices in previous decisions made
much of the fact that the President lacked legislative authorization for his wartime directive (Milligan), or that he acted
contrary to the will of Congress (Youngstown). But in Boumediene, the President had plainly secured Congress’s authorization to establish military tribunals, and the Court nonetheless
ruled against his assertion of power.195 Indeed, the President
sought this congressional authorization under the instruction
of some of the Justices just two years earlier. In Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,196 a precursor to Boumediene, members of the Court
informed the President that the system of military tribunals he
had unilaterally created would stand on firmer constitutional
cision in Boumediene has the possibility to “lead to the frustration and/or invalidation of existing [anti-terrorism] policies”).
188. William Glaberson, Lawyers for Detainees Plan to Use Justices’ Ruling
to Mount New Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2008, at A14.
189. Jonathan Mahler, Why This Court Keeps Rebuking This President,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, at WK3.
190. Robert Barnes, Justices Say Detainees Can Seek Release, WASH. POST,
June 13, 2008, at A1.
191. Mahler, supra note 189.
192. Farah Stockman, Justices Open US Court to Detainees: Deal Setback
to Bush; Influx of Cases Expected, BOSTON GLOBE, June 13, 2008, at A1.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2242, 2274 (2008) (explaining that although the MCA authorizes the creation of military tribunals, the
Act unconstitutionally suspends the writ of habeas corpus).
196. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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ground if he secured Congress’s formal authorization.197 At that
time, the system of military tribunals operated under a 2001
military order issued by the President.198 In 2006, therefore,
Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which
authorized the system of military tribunals proposed by the
President.199 In 2007, President Bush then issued executive order 13425, which, under the unmistakable authority of MCA,
superseded the original military order.200 Remarkably, though,
the Court in Boumediene still saw fit to overturn a system of
tribunals that both the President and Congress had a hand in
creating.
Dissenters in Boumediene charged the majority with a
“bait and switch,”201 an accusation that conservative media and
Republicans in Congress vaunted repeatedly in the days that
followed the ruling.202 But these objections raise a more fundamental question: if the Court was going to provide enemy
combatants with access to civilian courts, why did it not do so
in Hamdan rather than Boumediene?203 The President’s system
197. For example, Justice Breyer stated in his concurrence:
Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to create
military commissions of the kind at issue here. Nothing prevents the
President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary. Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation
with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not
weaken our Nation’s ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that
insistence strengthens the Nation’s ability to determine—through
democratic means—how best to do so. The Constitution places its
faith in those democratic means. Our Court today simply does the
same.
Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring). For more on this issue, see Michael P. Van
Allstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 309–71 (2006) (analyzing the “claimed power of the president to create
federal law on the foundation of the executive’s status as the constitutional
representative of the United States in foreign affairs”).
198. Military Order No. 222, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terror, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
199. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
200. Exec. Order No. 13,425, 72 Fed. Reg. 7,737 (Feb. 14, 2007).
201. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 2229, 2285 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. See, e.g., Editorial, Combating the Combatants Decision, NAT’L REV.,
June 13, 2008, http://author.nationalreview.com/?q=MjE1MQ== (follow “Combating the Combatants Decision – 06/13” hyperlink) (“There was still the fact
that Congress—at the beckoning of the very Court—had provided the jihadists
held at Gitmo with an unprecedented array of protections, including judicial
review.”).
203. In Hamdan, the Court found that the then-operating military tribun-
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of military tribunals, after all, stood on significantly stronger
ground in the latter case than in the former.204 Whereas President Bush was implementing a unilateral directive in the first
case, he was faithfully executing a congressional statute in the
latter.205 Moreover, the reconstituted military tribunals under
the MCA prohibited the use of evidence obtained by torture or
inhumane treatment,206 which, some argued, should have allayed concerns raised by the majority in Hamdan that the military tribunals violated the Geneva Conventions.207
One can only speculate about why the Court passed on the
opportunity to substantively reject a unilaterally-created tribunal system, only to do so two years later. Contributing factors, though, likely include the absence of any terrorist attack
stateside,208 the growing public disaffection with the Iraq
War,209 and the President’s poor standing with the American
public.210 This was a President, after all, whose party lost both
chambers of Congress in the 2006 midterm elections211 and who
als lacked “power to proceed,” but it stopped short of insisting that enemy
combatants have access to civilian courts. Instead of examining the President’s
argument that it would be impracticable to apply the rule and principles of
law that govern the trial of criminal cases in the United States districts courts’
to Hamdan’s commission, the Court called into question the President’s unwillingness to apply the “rules for courts-martial.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 567, 623 (2006).
204. Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 948b (“The President is authorized to establish military commissions under this chapter for offenses triable
by military commission as provided in this chapter.”).
205. Id.
206. Id. § 948r(b).
207. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567. See, in particular, Article 5 of the Third
Geneva Convention, which states that “should any doubt arise as to whether
persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands
of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as
their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
208. Patrick McGeehan, Bush Honors Veterans at the Intrepid, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2008, at A24 (mentioning “the absence of another terrorist attack on
American soil since 9/11”).
209. See Carl Hulse, On Wave of Voter Unrest, Democrats Take Control of
House, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at P2 (describing how “public dissatisfaction
with the Iraq war” was a primary reason for Democrats taking control of the
House).
210. See Paul Steinhauser, Poll: More Disapprove of Bush Than Any Other
President, CNN NEWS, May 1, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/05/
01/bush.poll/.
211. Hulse, supra note 209, at P2.
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registered among the lowest approval ratings in the modern
era.212 Crucially, the threat of terrorism in the eyes of many
had abated significantly, in part because of the lack of any attacks on the U.S. homeland. Reflecting on the Court’s ruling in
Hamdan, Robert Pushaw recognized that “the Justices usually
defer to the military judgments of the majoritarian branches,
often because they have no other realistic choice. If the terrorists escalate their attacks and the President responds aggressively, history suggests that the Court will back down.”213 Had
the United States suffered another catastrophic attack between
the summers of 2006 and 2008, it seems plausible that the Supreme Court would have rendered a different decision.
Boumediene itself offers evidence in support of this supposition. The Court repeatedly emphasized its appreciation for
the national security threat that the nation faced, and the importance of granting the President deference as he designed
policies to address it.214 Just as it did in Youngstown, however,
the Court in Boumediene ruled against the President because a
majority did not believe that the President’s policies were
strictly necessary for the nation to prevail in war.215 Justice
Kennedy wrote that, “although the Court is sensitive to the financial and administrative costs of holding the Suspension
Clause applicable in a case of military detention abroad, these
factors are not dispositive because the Government presents no
credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo
would be compromised if habeas courts had jurisdiction.”216 The
Court thus implies that if credible evidence did exist, then concerns about the “financial and administrative costs” of a ruling
against the President would not merely be salient, they would
prove dispositive.

212. Steinhauser, supra note 210.
213. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The ‘Enemy Combatant’ Cases in Historical
Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1005, 1078 (2007).
214. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008) (“The law
must accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and detain
those who pose a real danger to our security.”).
215. Id. at 2237.
216. Id. Later in the opinion, Kennedy again noted that, “[t]he Government
presents no credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo
would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ claims. And in light of the plenary control the United States asserts
over [Guantanamo Bay], none are apparent to us.” Id. at 2261.
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As it did in both Milligan and Youngstown, the Boumediene Court couched its opinion in language that appeared, at
least superficially, to reject crisis jurisprudence. Kennedy articulated the position most forcefully, insisting that, “[t]he laws
and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force,
in extraordinary times.”217 But notice the language here. Justice Kennedy did not write that the laws and Constitution must
bind the President in war just as tightly as they do in peace—
rather, they must merely “survive” and “remain in force.”218
And throughout the majority opinion, Kennedy identified material wartime conditions under which the Court might uphold
presidential policies.
The Court, for instance, raised a variety of concerns about
the type of war that preoccupied the nation. In particular, the
majority expressed skepticism that crisis jurisprudence requires the Court to defer to the President in a war that lacks
clear frontlines, enemies, and timetables.219 And just as Truman’s failure to secure a formal congressional authorization for
waging the Korean War influenced the majority in Youngstown,
so did Bush’s failure to formally declare war for the majority in
Boumediene. Kennedy emphasized that past practices of judicial deference during declared wars did not establish precedent
for the current military campaign.220 Though “common-law
courts abstained altogether from matters involving prisoners of
war, there was greater justification for doing so in the context
of declared wars with other nation states. Judicial intervention
might have complicated the military’s ability to negotiate exchange of prisoners with the enemy . . . .”221 Deference, the
Court explicitly recognized, is often justified during times of
war. But consistent with the dictates of crisis jurisprudence,
the Justices themselves must evaluate whether the exigencies
of a particular war require deference to a particular policy that,
all concede, would not withstand judicial scrutiny during peace.
Harkening back to Milligan, the Boumediene Court again
noted that the military tribunals, over which the government
retained complete control, were physically located far from the
217. Id. at 2277.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 2262 (discussing the immeasurable duration of conflict and
territorial limits of the war).
220. Id. at 2248–49.
221. Id.
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field of battle.222 Had this been otherwise, though, deference to
the President might have been justified. “[I]f the detention facility were located in an active theater of war,” Kennedy expressly noted, “arguments that issuing the writ would be ‘impracticable or anomalous’ would have more weight.”223 Then,
later in the opinion, Kennedy admitted that:
The real risks, the real threats, of terrorist attacks are constant and
not likely soon to abate. The ways to disrupt our life and laws are so
many and unforeseen that the Court should not attempt even some
general catalogue of crises that might occur. Certain principles are
apparent, however. Practical considerations and exigent circumstances inform the definition and reach of the law’s writs, including
habeas corpus.224

Substituting “government power” for “law’s writs” yields a
near-perfect expression of crisis jurisprudence. After all, crisis
jurisprudence does not require the judiciary to uphold every action taken by presidents during times of war. Rather, it asks
judges and Justices to evaluate the context in which presidents
take action. If courts deem the exigencies of the war at hand
sufficiently great, and the President’s policy sufficiently important to protecting the nation, then they are to recognize the exceptional nature of war and defer to the President, even though
a strict reading of existing statute or the Constitution counsels
otherwise.
Assessments of such “practical considerations” of war constitute the key point of disagreement between the five members
of the majority and the four dissenters in Boumediene. In his
dissent, Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly cautioned the Court
not to second-guess the elected branches, which retain more
expertise about the conduct of war than does the judiciary.225
And over and over again, Roberts quoted precedent in advocating that the government’s protection of individual rights be
“‘tailored to alleviate [the] uncommon potential to burden the
Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.’”226 The gov222. Id. at 2261–62 (noting how the facility is not “located in an active
theater of war”).
223. Id. (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result)).
224. Id. at 2274 –75. In his short concurrence, Justice Souter similarly
noted that “in periods of exigency the tempo of any habeas review must reflect
the immediate peril facing the country.” Id. at 2278, (Souter, J., concurring).
225. See, e.g., id. at 2280 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“All that today’s opinion has done is shift responsibility for those sensitive foreign policy and national security decisions from the elected branches to the Federal Judiciary.”).
226. Id. at 2285 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004)).
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ernment’s “weighty interests” during war deserved not mere
recognition, Roberts insisted; in this instance, they required actual deference.227
In his own dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia appeared simply
aghast at the majority’s unwillingness to defer to the other
branches of government as they fought the single most important war of the new millennium. He began his dissent with a
long list of the offences committed by terrorists against the
United States. “America is at war with radical Islamists,” he
intoned, and then proceeded to count off the number of U.S. citizens who died in every major terrorist attack since the 1983
bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon.228 The Court had
no business overturning a policy that both the President and
Congress deemed imperative to the nation’s fight against terrorism.229 Meddling in their affairs, Scalia ominously predicted,
“will make the war harder on us. It will almost certainly cause
more Americans to be killed.”230
Boumediene, it bears recognizing, does not settle the dispute over existing military tribunals. Detainees at Guantanamo now have greater access to U.S. civilian courts, but as of
this Article’s publication, it remains unclear what specific Due
Process protections they will be granted. We still do not know
whether civilian courts retain jurisdiction over only those detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, or whether the courts might
hear appeals from suspects held at other military posts around
the globe. And, of course, we have yet to see how the newlyelected President Barack Obama and the strengthened Democratic majorities in Congress will respond to this gauntlet laid
down by the Supreme Court.
One thing, though, is certain: as written, much of Boumediene actually affirms crisis jurisprudence. The majority recognized a variety of instances when judicial deference to the President is due in wartime, a central tenet of crisis jurisprudence.
The dissent, moreover, railed against the hubris demonstrated
by a group of Justices telling the elected branches how they

227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 2296 (“It is . . . clear that Congress and the Executive—both
political branches—have determined that limiting the role of civilian courts in
adjudicating whether prisoners captured abroad are properly detained is important to success in the war . . . .”).
230. Id. at 2294.
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ought to wage war. And a single vote separates the two sides on
this dispute.
Like the previous two cases, Boumediene also raises important questions about the timing of Supreme Court rulings on
presidential power. In Milligan, the Court waited until after
the Civil War had ended before overturning a conviction secured under Lincoln’s system of military tribunals. In
Youngstown, the Court ruled against a President who was waging a very different war (both in scope and popularity) than the
one he commenced two years earlier. And most striking, perhaps, the Court took a pass on Bush’s military tribunals in
Hamdan, only to overturn a statutorily authorized version of
them two years later in Boumediene. Late in unpopular wars,
when the nation has either grown accustomed to a perceived
foreign threat, or the threat itself has substantially abated,
presidents would appear most vulnerable to a setback in the
courts. If these three cases are emblematic of larger trends,
past and present, we can expect twenty-first century presidents
to initiate wars without substantial judicial interference, and to
enjoy continued deference as long as they maintain domestic
political support.
CONCLUSION
Milligan, Youngstown, and Boumediene affirm the Supreme Court’s willingness to periodically stand up to wartime
presidents. Justices will not permit presidents to do whatever
they please during times of war, summoning Locke or Lincoln
to justify acts that patently violate existing statutory or constitutional provisions. Those who advocate a narrow, “Business as
Usual” reading of the President’s commander-in-chief powers
can find language to support their claims in each of these three
cases.
It is important, though, not to overstate matters. For presidents waging war, these cases were not total defeats. Again
and again, the Court suggested alternative situations under
which it would uphold the President’s wartime policies. And in
each case, three or four dissenting Justices appeared convinced
that the contemporary war justified the President’s actions.
The cases, moreover, confirm the basic principles of crisis jurisprudence. Again, crisis jurisprudence does not dictate that political and constitutional checks on presidential powers wholly
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dissipate during times of war. Rather, crisis jurisprudence suggests that judges and Justices recognize the exceptional nature
of war and grant special allowances to the presidents who wage
it. In these three cases, a majority of Justices chose not to grant
such allowances. But almost every Justice admitted that under
different circumstances, they would. And in so doing, the Justices breathed life into crisis jurisprudence at the same moment
that they defied a president waging war. With these rulings,
the Court struck down, but not back.

